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The Brazilian privatization program has been a major undertaking by international standards. 
From 1991 to July 2001, the state transferred the control of 119 firms and minority stakes in a 
number of companies to the private sector. With respect to the companies in which the 
government had a majority of controlling shares (hereafter, state-owned enterprises, or SOEs), 
and those of which it only had minority control (hereafter, state-owned minority controlling 
stakes, or SOMCS), the auctions produced US$67.9 billion in revenues, plus the transfer of 
US$18.1 billion in debt. The government also sold US$6 billion in shares of firms that remained 
SOEs, obtained US$10 billion from new concessions of public services to the private sector, and 
sold US$1.1 billion in scattered non-control stakes in various private companies owned by 
BNDES, the National Social and Economic Development Bank. The magnitude of the Brazilian 
privatization program is among the largest in the world, making it worthy of closer analysis. 
  The Brazilian program has been also large in relative terms. Lora and Panizza (2002) 
compared the cumulative value of the privatization efforts between 1988 and 1999 as a 
proportion of GDP in ten South and Central American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, 
Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay). Brazil came in third 
place with a rate of 5% of GDP, above the average of 2.7% and surpassed only by Peru (6%) 
and Bolivia (9%).
2 Data for five countries in the region did not exceed 1%. 
  In spite of its magnitude, the Brazilian program has been largely ignored in the 
international literature. For instance, a survey by Megginson and Netter (2001) recognized the 
Brazilian program as “likely to remain very influential,” because of its scale and the size of the 
country.
3  However, their survey did not include any specific analysis of the Brazilian program. 
This is due to the paucity of studies, and also to the fact that most of the existing literature has 
been published in Brazil only, and in Portuguese. Furthermore, the existing studies have their 
                                                           
1 Anuatti-Neto, Barossi-Filho, Gledson de Carvalho and Macedo: Universidade de São Paulo and FIPE (Institute of 
Economic Research). Macedo: also Mackenzie University and FAAP (Armando Álvares Penteado Foundation, São 
Paulo).  This paper was developed with financial support from FIPE and from the LACRNP (Latin American and 
Caribbean Research Network Program) of the Inter-American Development Bank. These institutions are not 
responsible for the views expressed in this paper. Compared to a version of this paper that was completed in late 
2001, this one is more expanded, but not in terms of the data and the tests used in the empirical analysis. The 
assistance of Economática, Austin Assis and the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in assembling the data set used in the 
analysis, and of Renata Domingos and Alan de Genaro Dario in processing it, is gratefully acknowledged.   
Remaining errors are the authors’ alone. 
2 These numbers, as well as others that will be quoted from the same study, are approximations. 
3 Megginson and Netter (2001: 326). 
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shortcomings, as will be clear from their review in this paper. Therefore, there is room for 
adding to both the Brazilian and the international literature. 
It is also important to disseminate findings among the Brazilian public at large. The 
economy’s performance was very disappointing in the 1990s. Some groups, among them 
politicians and journalists, have often expressed their frustration with privatization and other 
reform and adjustment policies, blaming them for the sluggish growth of the economy. In part 
because of this, the program all but stalled after 1998. Thus, it is crucial to show the results of 
the privatization program as such, as this will shed light on a discussion largely based on 
unwarranted conclusions. 
With regard to theoretical aspects, privatization is a topic of the wider and continuing 
debate on the role of the government in the economy. In this paper, the analysis is primarily 
focused on the relative effectiveness of private versus public ownership of companies that 
underwent privatization in Brazil. As a working hypothesis, the paper tests the proposition that 
private ownership is more effective, but it also looks at the ways by which privatization results 
in increased profits, such as higher prices and reduced employment. Moreover, it also discusses 
the management of the privatization process in terms of its macroeconomic implications and in 
its objective of democratizing capital ownership, among other issues.  In this fashion, the paper 
provides empirical evidence important to understanding the role of public ownership in the 
country, as well as the process by which the state has been stepping back from an 
entrepreneurial role.   
The text is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Brazilian privatization program 
and surveys the literature on it. Section 3 presents the variables and the data set used in the 
empirical analysis.  Section 4 summarizes the methodology and the empirical results. Section 5 
contains a discussion of other benefits the program, in addition to those found in Section 6, as 
well as some costs. Section 6 discusses public opinion on the privatization program in Brazil 
and compares those views with those in other countries in the same region. It also evaluates the 
perspectives for new privatization efforts in the country. Section 7 summarizes the major 
conclusions. Finally, Appendix 1 presents a list of the privatized companies and of those that 
remain SOEs, and Appendix 2 describes the technical procedures adopted in the tests of means 
and medians, as well as their detailed results.  
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2.  The Brazilian Privatization Program and the Literature
4 
 
The Brazilian privatization program has three components: (a) the federal National Program of 
“Destatization” (NPD), which started in 1991; (b) similar programs at the state level, which 
began in 1996; and (c) the privatization program of the telecommunications industry. This last 
component was launched in 1997 as a program at the federal level, separate from the NPD but 
running parallel to it. We shall refer to it as the telecom program. Its auctions, mostly taking 
place in 1997 and 1998, produced a total of US$28.8 billion in revenues plus US$2.1 billion in 
debt transfers. The NPD yielded a total of US$28.2 billion in revenues plus US$9.2 billion in 
debt transfers, while the state level program produced a total of US$27.9 billion in revenues plus 
US$6.8 billion in debt transfers.
5  
The total program’s composition by industry shows that electricity accounted for 31% of 
the total value of the auctions; telecommunications, 31%; steel, 8%; mining, 8%; oil and gas, 
7%; petrochemicals, 7%; financial, 6%; and others, 2%. Largely due to the telecom program, 
privatization reached a peak in 1997-98, a period that accounted for 69% of the total value as of 
July 2001. This will have important implications for the analysis in Section 5 of the 
macroeconomic impact of the program in terms of fiscal crises and external imbalances.
6 
Before moving on to the literature on the program, the following questions are 
addressed: 1) what enterprises did the government own before the program; 2) what enterprises 
have been privatized, and 3) what enterprises still remain under government control. We have 
little information on the initial situation in the various Brazilian state governments and on what 
remains to be privatized. Therefore, with respect to questions (1) and (3), we will focus on the 
federal level only, the most important part of the program. With respect to what has been 
privatized, our information covers the whole program, except for the concession of public 
services. 
                                                           
4 This section draws from Macedo (2000), and updates and extends his analysis. 
5 These values exclude concessions of public services. 
6  BNDES is the major source of data on the Brazilian privatization program as a whole. It was given the task of 
managing it, including a part developed at the state level. The reports and other documents used as sources are 
BNDES (1999a, 1999b and 2001).  
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2.1.  An Overview of Privatization at the Federal Level  
 
In 1980 the federal government undertook a survey of all its “entities,” including companies, 
foundations, port authorities, research institutes and councils in charge of professional 
registration. There were 560 such institutions, of which 250 were organized as firms (mainly in 
the form of corporations). In the 1980s, some minor privatizations occurred, and a few firms 
were also closed. Moreover, at the start of the program in 1991, other entities had also ceased to 
exist. As a result, the program was launched with 186 firms still under government control. At 
the end of 2000, mainly because of the privatization program, this number was reduced to 102. 
  Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1 lists the companies privatized by the federal government 
since 1990. Table A.1.2 lists the firms privatized on behalf of some states by BNDES, some 
minority controlling stakes formerly held by the federal government, and firms privatized by the 
state of São Paulo. In both tables, we refer to the firms included in our sample and the revenue 
obtained from their privatization.  A reference is also made to the companies that were listed on 
the São Paulo stock exchange before privatization. 
Table A.1.3 includes the remaining SOEs. The group includes hospitals, port authorities, 
the postal service, an agricultural research firm, the BNDES and others. Among the remaining 
companies, the major ones are in: a) the electricity industry (item 1.1 of the list), the 
privatization of which has been postponed; b) the oil industry (item 1.2); and c) the financial 
sector (item 2), in which a few federal banks and most state banks have already been privatized, 
the latter group having been federalized for this purpose. Finally, item 3 contains a group of 
entities organized as corporations over which the government exercises 100% control. Some of 
them are government agencies disguised as corporations. These firms are directly linked to the 
federal budget, from which they receive practically all the resources they use. 
The program has made little progress since 1998. Among other reasons, privatization 
and other liberalization measures coincided with sluggish growth and this weakened support for 
the program. Moreover, some accusations that the government had used excessive methods to 
bring interested groups to the telecom auctions caused a furor in the press and led the Minister 
of Telecommunications to resign in 1998.  Furthermore, if continued, the program would extend 
into politically sensitive areas such as electricity, where the states are very strong; oil, where the 
gigantic Petrobrás still arouses strong nationalistic feelings; and the almost two hundred-year-
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old Banco do Brasil, which plays an important role in financing farmers and therefore enjoys 
strong political support.  
 
2.2.  The Brazilian Literature on Privatization  
 
In reviewing this literature, we will concentrate on the studies that have addressed the status of 
the SOEs before and after privatization, as this is the major focus of this paper. Section 5 will 
refer to the literature on other issues as well.  
Three studies are worth reviewing. Pinheiro and Giambiagi (1997) of BNDES presented 
an overall evaluation of the pre-privatization performance of federal SOEs in the 1981-94 
period. They showed disappointing figures for the SOEs, both in terms of profitability and 
dividends received by the Treasury. Over that whole period, the ratio of profits to net assets was 
negative 2.5% on average. Moreover, from 1988 to 1994, years for which data on dividends 
were available, they accounted for only 0.4% of the equity capital owned by the federal 
government in the SOEs. 
One of the causes of this disappointing performance was the SOEs’ wage policies. 
Macedo (1985) undertook a comprehensive analysis of wage differentials between private firms 
and SOEs. His data consisted of wages and other characteristics of individual workers, obtained 
from forms filled out by firms every year, as required by the Ministry of Labor.
7  He compared 
the wages of the workers in private firms and SOEs of approximately the same size in ten 
industries. After controlling for differences in education, age, gender and experience, he found 
sizable differentials in favor of the workers at the SOEs.
8  
The third study is Pinheiro (1996). He analyzed the performance of 50 former SOEs 
before and after privatization, using data until 1994.  His data covered 1 to 4 years before and 
after privatization for each company and came from data sets similar to those used in this study, 
but complemented by questionnaires filled out by the firms and delivered to BNDES for that 
purpose. Unfortunately, the bank’s policy prevents the use of the data by outsiders. The study 
covered eight variables: net sales, net profit, net assets, investment, fixed investment, number of 
employees, debt and an index of liquidity. From these variables, another six were derived to 
                                                           
7 The same kind of data will be used in the analysis of employment effects in Section 6. This data base is known as 
RAIS (Annual Survey of Social Data). 
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measure efficiency: sales and profit by employee, the rate of return in the form of profit to sales 
and to net assets, and the propensity to invest, both with respect to sales and to assets. No 
comparison was made to the performance of the private sector, as a control group, nor was a 
distinction made between listed and unlisted companies. 
The conclusion was that “in general, the obtained results confirm that privatization 
brings a significant improvement...of the performance of the firms.  Thus, for most of the 
variables, the null hypothesis of no change in behavior is rejected in favor of the alternative 
hypotheses that privatization increases the production, the efficiency, the profitability and the 
propensity to invest, reduces employment and improves the financial indicators of the firms.”
9 
This paper adds to this literature in various respects, as will become clear from the 
analysis that follows. It has been carried out by an independent team, while most of the prior 
major studies have been produced by staff members of BNDES. It covers a larger number of 
firms until the year 2000, and utilizes data that can be disclosed. We took explicit care to avoid a 
selection bias by including both large and small privatized firms, SOEs and cases of SOMCS, as 
well as firms both listed on the stock exchange and unlisted. In addition to tests of means, the 
empirical work also employs panel data analysis. Moreover, the analysis of performance before 
and after privatization is also made in comparison to the indicators observed in the private sector 
during the same periods. 
The importance of this last feature must be underscored, as the Brazilian economy 
underwent various cycles in the pre- and post-privatization periods. In summary, after strong 
growth in 1994 and 1995 when a modest number of companies were privatized, there was 
sluggish performance thereafter, followed by a strong recovery in 2000, after the program had 
passed its peak. Thus, economic cycles might have affected the performance of former SOEs. 
The absence of control for this effect could have blurred the results of the impact of 
privatization. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
8 The differential, net of the workers’ characteristics, reached a peak of 80%. This occurred when the workers’ 
characteristics were valued according to the private sector criteria, as measured by the regression coefficients of the 
workers’ characteristics in the wage equation of that sector. 
9 More recently, in a seminar sponsored by BNDES to celebrate the 10
th anniversary of the privatization program, 
Pinheiro (2000) presented some additional and updated results, again based on data that cannot be disclosed, this 
time covering 55 firms.  Without the form of a scientific paper, the analysis simply compared the performance of 
the firms before and after privatization, thus not relating their performance with those of the private firms. He found 
sizable increases in net operational revenues, investment, net profit, productivity, tax collections, as well as a 
reduction in employment, in some cases compensated by an expansion in contracted-out services. We will return to 
the question of employment in Section 6. 
  8 
3. The Data Set and the Variables 
 
3.1. The Sample 
 
Our data set is based on the annual financial statements (balance sheets, income statements and 
cash flows) of the former SOEs and of a number of private companies used as a control group. 
Brazilian accounting standards and procedures, as established by law and regulatory agencies, 
have remained the same for the whole period, thus facilitating our analysis.
10 The data range 
from 1987 to 2000. The financial statements were obtained from two consulting firms 
(Economática and Austin Assis) and an NGO (the Getúlio Vargas Foundation). All three collect 
financial statements from several sources, including newspapers. We excluded from our analysis 
the privatizations in the financial sector, as that sector has a unique structure, involves specific 
issues, and would have required specialized analysis.  We also excluded the cases in which 
BNDES sold minor non-control participations in scattered companies as part of its portfolio as a 
development bank.  Thus, we focused only on sales of control packages, both of a majority and 
minority nature. These procedures are among those shown in Table 1 to explain the coverage of 
the sample. 
To proceed, it is necessary to distinguish privatization contracts (or auctions) from 
privatized enterprises. A number of former SOEs were sold as a block, and the successful bidder 
for an operational holding company was also given access to the control of its subsidiaries. In 
the case of the telecom sector, for instance, five amalgamated blocks of privatization auctions 
covered the entire local, cellular long distance and international restructured segments. 
In this fashion, the data set of the sampled companies covers 66 privatization contracts, 
corresponding to 102 firms. From the figures in Table 1, it can be inferred that the sample 
covers 64% of the control packages, 69% of the firms they include, and 94% of the total value 
of the auctions. The smaller number of companies in the mean and median tests is explained by 
the methodology adopted and described in the next section. 
With respect to the 37 contracts not included, which correspond to 45 companies and 
yielded proceeds of US$4.9 billion as listed in Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1, there was no 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
10 High rates of inflation plagued the economy from 1986 to 1994, a period in which indexation following legal 
rules was widespread. As the analysis will be developed in terms of ratios based on flow variables, such as 
operating income to sales, the problems of inflation and indexation are circumvented. For a few cases in which the 
absolute value of the indicator is used, the original values in Brazilian currency were converted into dollars. 
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information in the sources named above. The attempts to gather information from BNDES white 
books were frustrated by non-disclosure and confidentiality rules with respect to data held by 
the bank.
11 Table 2 summarizes the number of excluded companies by industry, as well as their 
value at the auctions. 
 
Table 1. Description and Coverage of the Sample 




   Auction Results 
(US$ Million)* 
Financial sector  9   9    5,112.30  
Minority sales in SOEs  6   6    6,164.10  
BNDES participations         1,146,00  
Control package sales  103   147    76,878.20  
PRIVATIZATION 
PROGRAM 
(1991 – 2000) 
Total 118    162    89,439.20   
State minority control  16   16    1,299.20  
St SAMPLE (control 
package sales only)  ate majority control  50   86    70,709.80  
Total 66    102    72,009.00  
Mean/median tests   73    68,062.50   
Control packages     102   72,009.00   
SOEs  20      
STATISTICAL 
METHODS OF 
ANALYSIS  Panel 
Private sector  158      
(*) Includes transferred debt (US$17.8 billion) and offers to employees in the telecommunications 
industry (US$0.3 billion), but excludes concessions of new services (US$7.7 billion). 
 
 
Table 2. Excluded Companies 
 
Industry  Number  Value in US$ Million 
Electricity and gas distribution  4  2,224.4 
Petrochemicals 7  587.6 
Fertilizers and chemicals  7  475.1 
Railways 8  1,112.8 
Ports and container terminals  7  429.7 
Others 12  40.4 
Total 45  4,880.0 
Source:  Table A.1.1 in Appendix 1. 
                                                           
11 In the process of privatization, BNDES franchised to interested bidders the existing information on the firms. The 
files are kept by the bank, but they are considered a proprietary right of the winning bidder. By means of 
questionnaires, BNDES has also occasionally gathered information from the firms in their post-privatization phase, 
but responded to our request for both types of data saying that it could not make them available to third parties.  
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With respect to electricity companies, we have included all but two of them. In the case 
of gas distribution firms (all of them privatized at the state level), our sample includes one of the 
three companies that underwent privatization. 
In terms of the petrochemical, fertilizer and chemical plants, more companies are 
included than excluded. The latter group includes various limited liability companies, which are 
not required to make their balance sheets and income statements public. 
Although they are not important in economic size, the release of information on the 
privatized railways and ports could yield interesting case studies, as privatization came with 
restructuring of these industries yet the government still plays an active role in them. The 
railways were operated under regional branches of the federal railway network and split into 
regional companies for privatization purposes only. The regional port facilities had been 
separate companies, operating under a federal holding company. In this case, privatization led to 
the creation of specialized terminals to be leased to private operators, with part of the 
infrastructure facilities remaining in the hands of SOEs. Thus, if data were available, one could 
compare the performance of both private and SOEs working side by side.   
The companies under the heading “others” include miscellaneous activities, such as bus 
terminals, data processing and ferryboats. “Various” refers to small firms that are not organized 
as corporations and are also not required to make their balance sheets and income statements 
public. 
Thus, what was left outside of our sample represents only a minor part of the program, 
but not an uninteresting group for industry- and firm-specific studies. Their absence, due to 
insurmountable difficulties, does not jeopardize the relevance of our sample as representative of 
the companies that underwent privatization in Brazil. When the information was available, as it 
was for most of the companies and the most important ones, it was included in the sample.   
Given the nature of our data set, it involves essentially the same variables used by La 
Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes (1999) in their study of the Mexican case.  Fifteen financial 
indicators, according to seven criteria, make up this set of variables, as described in Table 3.      
  11 
Table 3. Description of the Variables  
 
CRITERION VARIABLE  DESCRIPTION 
Operating Income/Sales 
(OI/S) 
The ratio of operating income to sales. Operating 
income is equal to sales minus operating expenses, 
minus cost of sales, and minus depreciation. Sales 
are equal to total value of products and services sold 
minus sales returns and discounts. 
Operating Income/Property, 
Plant and Equipment 
(OI/PPE) 
The ratio of operating income to property, plant and 
equipment, which comprise the value of a company’s 
fixed assets adjusted for inflation. 
Net Income/Sales 
 (NI/S) 
The ratio of net income to sales. Net income is equal 
to operating income minus interest expenses and net 
taxes paid.  
ROA  Ratio of net income to total assets. 
PROFITABILITY 
ROE  Ratio of net income to equity.  
Log (S/PPE)  Sales and PPE as above.  
OPERATING 
EFFICIENCY  Operating Costs/Sales 
(OC/S)  Ratio of operating expenses to sales.  
Log (PPE)  Property, Plant and Equipment as above. 
Investment/Sales 
(I/S)  Investment and sales as above.   ASSETS 
Investment/Property, Plant 
and Equipment  
(I/PPE) 
Investment and Property, Plant and Equipment as 
above. 
OUTPUT  Log (Sales)  Sales as above.  
SHAREHOLDERS  Payout Ratio  Ratio of total dividends to net income. 
Current  The ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
FINANCE 
Long Term Debt/Equity 
(LTD/E)  Ratio of long term debt to equity 
NET TAXES  Net Taxes/Sales 
(NT/S) 
The ratio of net taxes to sales. Net taxes are equal to 
corporate income taxes paid net of direct subsidies 
or tax credits received during the fiscal year.  
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4. Empirical Analysis  
 
Two different approaches were adopted to examine changes in performance after privatization: 
mean and median tests and panel data analysis. 
  
4.1.  Mean and Median Tests  
 
For the mean and median tests, two different methods were used. In the first one (Method I), for 
each indicator a comparison is made between the mean and median values of the two years 
following privatization and their values in the two years before privatization.
12 The second 
procedure (Method II) fully utilizes the information in the data set by comparing the mean and 
medians of all years after privatization with their values in all years before.  
  The Brazilian economy experienced cycles over the course of the period during which 
privatization took place. Thus, changes in performance could reflect cyclical movements of the 
economy, rather than changes due to privatization. To circumvent this problem, in each method 
we also used, as an alternative procedure, a control group of private companies. The 
performance of the privatized companies was adjusted by taking the difference between the 
indicator for the privatized enterprise and the average of the indicator for the control group. 
Thus, we followed a procedure close to the one used by La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) 
who adopted, in their words, “industry-adjusted changes in performance for the sample of 
privatized firms.”
13 Appendix 2 details these procedures.  
Table 4 summarizes the results in terms of their signs and statistical significance. The 
complete results are presented in Tables A.2.1 to A.2.4 in Appendix 2.  
                                                           
12 This procedure differs from that of La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999) in that they used one fixed year for the 
period after privatization. In the Mexican case, privatization was heavily concentrated in a few years. In Brazil, it 
has been extended over a decade and more. Therefore, a fixed year for comparison would be inadequate. 
13 Our adjustment, however, could not be done by industry, as some privatized enterprises do not have a 
corresponding match in the private sector. This is the case, for instance, of the major mining company CVRD 
(Companhia Vale do Rio Doce), the telecoms and many companies in the energy sector. 
  13 
Table 4. Summary of Tables A.1.1 to A.1.4  
   TABLES (*) 
CRITERION INDICATOR  A.2.1 A.2.2 A.2.3 A.2.4 
Operating Income/Sales  +  - + + 
      
Operating Income/PPE  +  +  +  + 
      
Net Income/Sales  - - +  + 
      
ROA  + + +  + 
      
PROFITABILITY 
ROE  +  +  +  + 
Log (Sales/PPE)  +  +  +  + 
         OPERATING EFFICIENCY 
Operating Cost/Sales  - - -  - 
Log (PPE)  - - -  - 
        
Investment/Sales  -  - - - 
      
ASSETS 
Investment/PPE  - - +  + 
OUTPUT  Log (Sales)  +  +  +  + 
SHAREHOLDERS  Payout  - - -  - 
Current  +  +  +  + 
         FINANCE 
LTD/Equity  + - +  - 
NET TAXES  Net Taxes/Sales  -  -  -  - 
The shading means that the coefficient is significant at least at the ten-percent level. 
(*) Table A.2.1: Method I, without adjustment; Table A.2.2: Method I, with adjustment; 
Table A.2.3: Method II, without adjustment; Table A.2.4: Method II, with adjustment.       
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4.1.1.  Profitability  
 
In general, the results indicate an improvement in the profitability of the privatized companies. 
Considering operating income to PPE, return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE), 
performance after privatization improves regardless of the method adopted. The increase of 
operating income to PPE is evident once the change in the median or median is always positive 
and significant, at least at the ten-percent level. The statistics for ROE and ROA are also always 
positive. In the case of ROE, three of the four statistics are significant, while for ROA only two 
reveal significance. 
A slightly different picture appears when we consider operating income to sales. Looking 
at the sign of the change, this indicator improves after privatization, except in Method I and in 
comparison with the private sector, as the change becomes negative and significant at the ten-
percent level (Table A.2.2). Little can be said in terms of net income to sales. The sign of the 
coefficients varies across methods and fails to present statistical significance. 
At the firm level, various reasons could account for results of this kind. At this point, the 
method’s weakness in investigating in detail the sources of variance becomes apparent, and this 
underscores the importance of using a different approach to test explanatory variables other than 
privatization, as will be done later in this section by using panel data analysis.           
 
4.1.2.  Operating Efficiency  
 
The results strongly suggest an improvement in efficiency. In all tables we observe an increase 
in sales to PPE and a reduction in operating costs to sales. In the case of sales to PPE, all the 
statistics are positive and significant, strongly suggesting that privatized firms became more 
efficient in the use of their assets. Regarding operating costs to sales, all the statistics present a 
negative sign, while only one of them lacks significance at the ten-percent level. As illustrated in 
Table A.2.1, the mean of the two years after privatization is 0.251, while the mean for the two 
years before privatization is 0.375, a reduction of 33%, thus providing evidence of improved 
efficiency at the operational level. 
 
4.1.3.  Assets and Output  
 
Apparently, privatization had a negative impact on investment. In all the tables the Log (PPE) 
and investment/sales statistics present a negative sign. The negative coefficients for Log (PPE) 
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are significant in Tables A.2.1 and A.2.4, while for investment/sales negative coefficients are 
significant only when considering two years before and after (Tables A.2.1 and A.2.2). These 
results seem consistent with the increase in efficiency reported above. When considering 
investment to PPE, which reflects the rate of investment, there is no clear picture: the sign 
changes across tables, but none of the statistics is significant.  In the next subsection, the impact 
of privatization on assets will be further clarified.  
An observable effect of privatization on sales is a small but significant increase, 
observed in all tables. The statistics that test for difference in average are significant at the one-
percent level (A.2.1 and A.2.3). There is a small increase in sales even after adjusted to the 
performance of the private sector (Tables A.2.2 and A.2.4).  
 
4.1.4.  Finance and Shareholders   
 
With respect to the payout ratio, no conclusive evidence was obtained. The sign of the 
coefficient is consistently negative, although never significant. This could be due to the lack of 
information since this variable could be calculated only for a reduced number of firms (45).
14 
A clearer picture emerges with the financial management indicators. We observe an 
increase in the current ratio, both in absolute terms and in comparison with the private firms in 
our control group. The statistics for the difference in average are consistently positive and 
significant. Moreover, one observes that the adjusted mean/median is negative (Tables A.2.2 
and A.2.4), meaning that former SOEs, when compared to the control group, continued to 
present lower short-term solvency. The overall improvement indicates that SOEs, having 
government backing, are less concerned with achieving sound financial performance. 
With respect to long-term debt-to-equity (LTD-to-equity), we observe that when 
privatized firms are seen in isolation, privatization has a positive impact, as the coefficients in 
Tables A.2.1 and A.2.3 are significant and show an increase. However, when compared with the 
performance of the private firms, a different picture emerges, as the change in coefficients 
become negative (Tables A.2.2 and A.2.4). In any case, in the same tables the mean values after 
privatization (0.108 and –0.002, respectively) indicate that the leverage of former SOEs 
converged to values observed in the private sector. 
                                                           
14 This information was available only for listed companies.  
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These results with respect to financial structure are similar to those reported by La Porta 
and López-de-Silanes (1999). This can be explained by the almost null probability of insolvency 
of state-owned enterprises, once their credit status is guaranteed by the government. By losing 
government backing, these firms were forced to adjust by decreasing their LTD-to-equity and 
increasing their current ratios. 
 
4.1.5.  Net Taxes  
 
Our results indicate a clear decrease in net taxes to sales. All the coefficients are negative and 
significant at the one-percent level. There are two reasons for finding a clear and significant 
decrease in net taxes after privatization in Brazil. This variable is defined as the difference 
between calculated taxes and allowed deductions. With respect to the latter, as they do not come 
in the form of explicit subsidies, it is worthwhile to describe them in detail in order to interpret 
the results more accurately.  
Three general categories of deductions apply: fiscal incentives, compensation for 
previous losses, and tax credits. Losses incurred in one particular year may be deducted from 
income tax over several years. This, in particular, affected companies that were highly dollar-
indebted when the devaluation of the real occurred in early 1999. In fact, losses of this sort were 
also responsible for a decrease in net taxes even for the control group in 2000.         
With respect to tax credits, an important dimension is the legal treatment of the premium 
paid on asset value in mergers and acquisitions. Brazilian corporate law recognizes the 
premium, and it was regulated in the mid-1990s. The company taking over is allowed to set up a 
reserve account for the premium and amortize it over a period of five to ten years. When the 
reason for the premium paid over assets is based on expected future profits, the rebate is allowed 
in a period of up to five years. This benefit applies to mergers and acquisitions in general. Thus, 
both the overall private sector under restructuring and the privatized companies have been 
beneficiaries of these rebates. The existence of an explicit provision in declaring premia in 
concessions as expected future profits facilitates the use of this sort of tax credit in privatization. 
Therefore, there is a reasonable explanation for our result that net tax payments have decreased 
after privatization.  
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Taken as a whole, the results in this subsection support the view that privatization brought 
improvements in the performance of the firms. However, as pointed out, the mean and median 
tests leave room for a more comprehensive analysis that fully utilizes the variance of the data 
set, and allow for examining other aspects of the privatization process. This will be the focus of 
the next subsection.  
 
4.2.  Panel Data Analysis 
 
4.2.1. Methodological Aspects 
 
We start with a brief description of the technique used in this subsection. It is a dynamic version 
of panel data analysis, and focuses on individual heterogeneities over time, in particular the 
discontinuous effect of privatization. This approach is an alternative to generalizations of 
constant-intercept-and-slope models for panel data, which introduce dummy variables to 
account for effects of variables that are specific to individual cross-sectional units, but stay 
constant over time, together with the effects that are specific to each time period, but the same 
for all cross-sectional units. The analysis is dynamic because the lagged value of the 
independent variable is included in the model, and the panel is unbalanced as there are missing 
observations for some firms in the data set. 
Many economic relationships are dynamic in nature and another advantage of the panel 
data approach is that it allows for a better understanding of the dynamics of adjustment of a 
particular variable. However, the inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in the model causes 
problems, which are well known in the literature.
15 Following it, we opted to apply the Arellano 





                                                           
15 According to Baltagi (1995), this renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the error terms are 
not serially correlated. Baltagi (1995) and Hsiao (1986) also demonstrate that the same problem affects GLS and 
FGLS estimators. Finally, the instrumental variable (IV) estimation method alone leads to consistent, but not 
necessarily efficient, estimates of the parameters in the model because it does not make use of all the available 
moment conditions (See Ahn and Schmidt, 1995). 
16 For the lagged dependent variables, this method resorts to instrumental variables that are obtained in a dynamic 
panel data model once existent orthogonality conditions between these lagged values and the disturbances are taken 
into account. A set of valid instruments is represented by all the dependent variables lagged more than one period. 
In this paper, the parameter estimates were obtained by using as an instrument the independent variable lagged two 
years.  
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4.2.2. The Model and Variables 
 
To assess the effect of privatization on each performance indicator listed in Table 1 we relied on 
the following econometric model: 
 
it pt it it it i it e X P I I     M                          1 + + + + + = − δ β λ φ α , 
where: 
it I  represents the performance indicator for firm i in year t; 
it P , referred to as PRIVATIZATION, is a dummy variable that assumes a value of 1 if 
company i had already been privatized in year t and zero, otherwise; 
it X  is a set of control variables that are also firm-specific; and 
pt M , referred to as PRIVATE MEAN, is the mean value of the performance indicator for 
the group of private firms mentioned in Table 1, defined only over time, i.e., assuming 
for every year the same value across the cross-sections of privatized firms. 
 
The lagged dependent variable has been introduced to capture individual past trends and 
cycles. With regard to PRIVATIZATION, the hypothesis is that it improves the performance of 
the former SOEs.  
The set of variables in   includes:  it X
  SPLIT/MERGER: a dummy variable that accounts for restructuring of the firm prior to 
privatization through divesting or merging activities. It assumes a value of 1 if the company had 
at least one of these interventions, considering the year of intervention, and zero otherwise.  The 
impact of this control variable might be either positive or negative. 
MINORITY CONTROL: a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the government was 
part of the control group but owned only a minority participation in the pre-privatization phase, 
and zero otherwise. With this variable we intend to control for the fact that the presence of 
private partners in the control group may induce SOEs to adopt management similar to those of 
the private firms. Therefore, we expect a positive impact of this variable. 
LISTED: this is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the privatized enterprise 
was listed on the São Paulo stock exchange before privatization, and zero otherwise. The 
hypothesis is that publicly traded SOEs are also subject to investors’ scrutiny and, therefore, 
should present a performance closer to that of private firms. The dummy was applied only if the 
company had been listed before the privatization process started. Those listed for privatization 
were left out. 
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TRADABLE: a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if the privatized firm is in a 
tradable goods industry, following three criteria: a) its typical product is included in the 
international classification of tradable goods; b) it is free from non-tariff restrictions; and c) its 
effective protection tariff is not redundant.
17 The process of trade liberalization took place over 
the 1990s, with a timing that coincided with that of the privatization process. Thus, it is 
important to control for the corresponding effect.  
REGULATED: this dummy variable assumes a value of 1 if the privatized firm is in a 
regulated industry and zero, otherwise. For various industries, regulation was a byproduct of 
privatization and it might have affected the performance of the regulated firms.  Therefore, it is 
also important to control for the regulation effect.  
Finally, the variable PRIVATE MEAN represents in year t the average of the indicator 
over a control group of private and publicly traded companies. With this variable we aim to 
control for macroeconomic fluctuations and the state of business conditions in general. 
 
4.2.3. The Empirical Results 
 
The panel results are shown in Table 5.
18  Before discussing them, it should be noted that it is 
possible to decompose the   vector of the model into two groups. The first comprises the 
dummy variables associated with the environment confronted by the firms and are effective for 
all companies in the sample (TRADABLE, REGULATED and LISTED). The other contains 
firm-specific variables that affect only the companies that are the focus of the study 
(PRIVATIZATION, SPLIT/MERGER and MINORITY CONTROL).  
it X
In the case of firms operating in TRADABLE industries one observes the predominance 
of an inferior performance compared with those in non-tradable industries. This is found in the 
indicators of profitability, operational efficiency, output, sales and indebtedness. Firms also 
seem to pay higher net taxes to sales. The reason for an underperforming tradable sector is that, 
for most of that period, the country was promoting trade liberalization, a process aggravated 
from 1995 to 1998 by an exchange rate overvaluation.  
In the case of REGULATION, as its effects are likely to be different in the various 
industries, a more detailed analysis would be required to investigate them. In any case, the 
                                                           
17 See Kume (1996). 
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comparative analysis of regulated industries versus non-regulated ones shows a slightly better 
performance of the former in terms of profitability, investment, sales and indebtedness. This 
might be due to the fact that regulation brought incentives to performance, in particular more 
realistic prices for the regulated activities.  
For the privatized companies that underwent restructuring in the form of 
SPLIT/MERGERS, no discernable effect was found on profitability indicators. On the other 
hand, the same companies present evidence of inferior results in terms of operational efficiency, 
assets and outputs, indebtedness and net taxes. Notice that this dummy variable is in effect only 
for the period in which the intervention occurred and it is associated with the privatization 
intervention. So, the inferior results would have to be interpreted with respect to the 
performance of firms that were privatized without restructuring.  There is an open debate on the 
virtue of government-led adjustments in debt, labor force and firm activities prior to 
privatization (Megginson and Netter, 2001).  
The MINORITY CONTROL dummy shows two significant coefficients for profitability 
performance indicators, but it has a mixed result in terms of operational efficiency, with larger 
sales to PPE and slightly higher operational costs to sales. Firms privatized with these 
characteristics pay the highest net taxes to sales and have lower indebtedness, indicating that 
they did not benefit as much from the corporate tax credits that came with privatization, and that 
they had inferior access to credit compared to other privatized companies.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
18 In Table 5 the numbers below the coefficients are their standard errors. Regarding the payout ratio, the data were 
insufficient to run a panel data regression. 
  21Table 5. Changes in Performance: GMM-IV Panel Data Analysis 
 
Variables                OI/S  OI/PPE  NI/S ROA ROE Log 
(S/PPE) OC/S  Log 
(PPE)  I/S I/PPE Log  (S) Current  LTD/E NT/S
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0.000  0.000  0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.000  0.010 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.012 
 
***Significant at 1%. 
   **Significant at 5%. 
    *Significant at 10%. 
1/ Dummy variable introduced in order to overcome a devaluation bias in the variables after 1999. 




The dummy LISTED reveals a clearer positive effect for all criteria of performance. In 
particular, four of the five profitability indicators’ coefficients presented positive and 
significant signs. Listed companies also showed better indicators for operational efficiency, 
output and assets, and the largest long-term debt-to-equity indicator. The net tax to sales 
indicator has a negative sign again, as in Subsection 4.1.5, indicative of corporate tax benefits 
for listed companies. Thus, the results presented by this dummy caution against the bias in 
selecting only firms of this type in privatization studies. 
It is possible now to assess the net effects of PRIVATIZATION as a change in the 
intercept of each indicator. In general, its impact comes as hypothesized and stronger than the 
one revealed in Subsection 4.1. As it is the key variable under investigation, the results are 




Three out of the five indicators of profitability presented in Table 5 clearly reveal the 
improvement that comes with privatization, as its estimated parameters are positive and 
significant at the one-percent level.  Privatization coefficients for OI/S, ROA and ROE show 
an increase of 5.6%, 16.2% and 6.2%, respectively.  
 
4.2.5. Operational Efficiency 
 
Significant at the one-percent level, the coefficients of the privatization dummy show the 
expected sign, that is, an increase in sales to PPE and reduction in operating costs to sales. The 
favorable effect of privatization on operational efficiency is revealed by an increase of 7% in 
Log (S/PPE) and a reduction of 1.5% in OC/S.  
 
4.2.6. Assets and Output 
 
Significant PPE and sales are the only indicators measured by their absolute values, which are 
measured in dollars. As the Brazilian currency suffered a major devaluation early in 1999 that 
was not reversed in 2000, to capture the negative effect on these indicators we introduced a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 in those years and zero otherwise.  For both Log (PPE) 
and Log (Sales) the estimated coefficients were negative and significant at five percent. In the 
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Log (Sales) equation adjusted in this fashion, the impact of privatization on sales is small 
(0.8%), but positive and significant at the one-percent level.  
With regard to Log (PPE), even after taking devaluation into account, the privatization 
coefficient is negative, indicating a reduction of 1.2% in the productive assets of the firms. 
This result is consistent with the coefficients for privatization with respect to other asset 
indicators. An increase in Log (S/PPE) intensifies the use of productive assets, so a reduction 
of 3.2% of I/S is likely. As I/PPE shows a positive coefficient of 5.7% for privatization, the 
indication is that investments after privatization are moving into working capital.     
The indication of an increase in investments in the form of working capital is 
confirmed by a strong impact of privatization on the current ratio: a 14% increase, significant 
at the one-percent level. With respect to the long-term debt-to-equity, a likely outcome is that 
the privatized companies will seek to reduce the cost of capital, combining equity and debt in 
an efficient way. On the other hand, state-owned enterprises are likely to increase debt, saving 
the Treasury from investing in their equity as their credit status, guaranteed by the 
government, has a small probability of default. This situation may lead to large LTD-to-equity 
ratios. After privatization and the loss of government backing, privatized firms are forced to 
adjust by decreasing this ratio and increasing the current ratio. Accordingly, the privatization 
coefficient for long-term debt-to-equity (LTD/E) shows a reduction in indebtedness of 2.9%, 
significant at the ten-percent level. It is interesting to observe the coefficients estimated for 
SPLIT/MERGERS (–23.5%) and MINORITY (–13.7%), which magnifiy the impact of losing 
government backing. 
With respect to net taxes, the coefficient of privatization is negative and significant at 
the one-percent level. The reasons are those already presented in Subsection 4.1, now 
confirmed by a panel data analysis.  
 
4.2.7. Other Variables in the Model 
 
The coefficient of the private mean is positive and significant for all indicators, reflecting the 
impact of overall business and macroeconomic conditions. It also cautions against another 
distortion of some studies on privatization in which the impact of privatization from the 
changes in these conditions over time is not isolated.    
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  With regard to the coefficients of the lagged variable, instrumented by its two-period 
version, they are all positive and significant, revealing that the past behavior of a firm’s 
indicators have a strong influence on their current performance. On top of this effect other 
variables exert influence, such as those encountered above.  
 
5. Other Benefits and Costs of the Program  
 
The improvement in the privatized firms’ performance shown in the previous section can be 
viewed as a benefit, as it contributes to the efficiency of the economy as a whole.  This section 
addresses other benefits, as well as some costs, of the program. It also seeks to identify some 
sources of the gains made by privatized firms in the form of reductions in employment and 




One of the weaknesses of Brazilian data is that there is no comprehensive, reliable and unified 
record of the number of employees at the privatized companies before and after their sale.  
Financial statements and annual reports, including those of listed firms, are not required to 
include information on employment, and companies provide it at their own discretion. There 
are also no uniform requirements for including payroll information in these reports and 
statements, which bundle wage and salary costs together with other operational costs.  
Even when employment and payroll data are available, their analysis is handicapped 
for other reasons. In Brazil, there are strong incentives for the adoption of outsourced services, 
such as security, cleaning, maintenance and accounting. Outsourcing has become a widespread 
practice to reduce labor costs, as service providers are usually smaller firms and pay lower 
wages. In addition, one often finds workers disguised as business owners to avoid heavy 
taxation of wages and salaries.
19  Most workers prefer formal contracts with employers; firms 
and unions also press for this and are more successful with SOEs. It is therefore very likely 
that privatization has led to an extension of outsourcing.  Thus, a reduction of employment in a 
 
19 The incentives gained strength after new “social rights” were established by the Constitution of 1988, as 
detailed by Fernandes (1998). 
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company would not necessarily mean a reduction in the jobs generated by its activities along 
its chain of suppliers.
20 
Given this picture, the employment effects at the industry level will be examined first, 
as there are aggregate data. Then, for a limited number of former SOEs, the focus will move to 
employment data from the files of Exame, a business magazine that collects financial 
statements and reports of Brazilian firms, as well as scattered employment data from them and 
other sources.  
In Brazil, the most important source of data on formal employment is RAIS (Annual 
Survey of Social Data) from the Ministry of Labor and Employment.  All firms and the 
government are required annually to list workers and their characteristics.  Individual firms 
cannot be identified in the samples. This source has consistent data for the period 1995 to 
1999.  
Table 6 shows data on employment for the industries in which the most important 
privatizations have occurred. In public utilities, privatization came later and in a less complete 
fashion than in the electricity industry. One can see that until 1997 the private sector was 
responsible for less than one-twentieth of employment in this industry, less than a third in 
water and sewage, a quarter in telecommunications and a fifth in piped gas distribution. By 
1999, both in the telecommunications and gas distribution sectors the larger part of 
employment moved to private companies. In the electricity, water and sewage sectors, 
employment is still largely in SOEs and public enterprises, but now with a significant mix.   
In electricity, the table shows a clear reduction in employment following privatization. 
The same holds for the piped gas distribution industry. In telecommunications, the impact in 
reducing employment is less clear, one of the reasons being the fact that following 
privatization the provision of services expanded very rapidly. Worth mentioning is the case of 
the water and sewage industry. Still largely in the hands of the government and not expanding 
 
20 Pinheiro (2000) tackled both the direct and contracting-out impact on employment, on the basis of 
questionnaires sent to the privatized firms by BNDES.  He found a 33% reduction in the total number of formal 
workers. For production workers, the reduction was 29.5%, evidence that overstaffing was concentrated in white-
collar workers. In absolute numbers, he found that, excluding telecommunications, the total reduction was 10,000 
workers in the year of privatization and 35,000 in the year before, thus showing adjustment by SOEs before 
privatization. In the telecommunications sector, he found that 145,000 new jobs were contracted out to expand 
services. This number might sound high, but notice that in this country of 170 million inhabitants, the number of 
fixed telephone lines increased from 9.6 per one hundred people in 1996 to 21.4 in 2000, while the number of 
cellular phones rose from 1.6 per one hundred people to 12.9, an expansion that has required a lot of labor, 
particularly in the case of fixed lines.   
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as quickly as telecommunications, its employment ranks high in stability among the industries 
shown in the table. Note also the recovery of employment in petrochemicals and in iron and 
steel, showing that after employment adjusts following privatization, the growth of investment 
and production leads to new jobs. 
 
 
  27Table 6. Employment in Selected Industries, by Public/Private Ownership, 1995-1999 
Number of Employees as of December 31
st 
            1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
SECTOR  Total          Total Total Total Total
  Public % Private % Public %  Private % Public %  Private % Public %  Private % Public %  Private %
39,131          38,060 31,447 39,955 35,763
Mining  18  82                  18 82 1 99 1 99 1 99
14,442          21,546 16,963 13,923 10,590
Petroleum  76  24                  82 18 72 28 62 38 39 61
6,460          7,145 8,395 12,563 11,907
Fertilizers  18  82                  9 91 11 89 1 99 1 99
15,739          14,947 19,018 26,263 28,935
Petrochemicals  5  95                  2 98 0 100 1 99 1 99
376,220          369,234 385,064 429,965 446,949
Iron & Steel   5  95                  5 95 2 98 2 98 2 98
149,100          128,545 99,871 111,225 95,870
Electricity  97  3                  97 3 95 5 64 36 55 45
3,257          2,640 1,551 1,763 1,437
Gas Distribution  92  8                  89 11 83 17 60 40 31 69
135,313          146,791 159,588 145,375 149,822
Water & Sewage  68  32                  72 28 66 34 66 34 62 38
107,689          113,126 117,740 105,284 109,478
Telecommunications  80  20                  77 23 75 25 19 81 26 74




Moving to the employment data from the Exame’s files, they cover companies 
privatized in the period 1995-2000, with missing data, but in any case allowing a comparison 
between the pre- and post-privatization years. Chart 1 shows data for 49 companies in the 
form of a box-plot diagram. The reduction in employment emerges clearly from the plotted 
data as 43 companies showed a reduction in employment while only 6 revealed an increase. 
Tests were performed by taking their average number of employees in at least two years 
before and after privatization.  The Wilcoxon signed rank test presented a Z-difference of –
5.217, significant at 1%, while the t-test showed a value of 3.906, significant at 5%.  
 
 
Figure 1. Formal Employment before and after Privatization  
Sample of Companies, 1995-2000 
 
49 49 N = 









































Our conclusion is that a share of the costs of privatization have been borne by some of 
the workers directly employed by the former SOEs who lost their jobs either in the process of 
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adjustment for the sale or thereafter. This is an inevitable outcome of privatization as new 
owners seek higher efficiency. Thus, this reduction in employment was one of the sources of 
gains reported in the previous section.  However, as privatized firms invest and expand their 
activities, at some point this increases employment, although the same workers are not 
necessarily rehired and some of them might continue to suffer the costs of displacement and 
reallocation. In the Brazilian case, the widespread use of outsourced services often blurs the 
picture, as positive impacts are not necessarily captured by the direct employment data of 




Following privatization, newly established regulatory agencies moved to more realistic prices 
particularly in the areas of electricity and telecommunications. The government had to 
announce this policy during the privatization process to guarantee the success of the auctions. 
Moreover, because of the overvaluation of the real and trade liberalization reforms undertaken 
since the early 1990s, the tradable industries were exposed to increased competition.  
To show some of the relevant changes in relative prices, a comparison was made of 
various price indices at the industry level with an overall price index, the CPI-A calculated by 
IBGE, the Brazilian census bureau, as presented in Table 7.  We took August 1994 prices as a 
reference for the other indices.  In the tradable industries, such as iron and steel, non-ferrous 
metals and non-metallic minerals, fertilizers and plastics, largely affected by the overvaluation 
of the real, domestic prices lagged behind CPI-A variations for the years 1994 to 1998. After 
devaluation, prices in these industries clearly catch up to the CPI-A. This sheds light on one of 
the findings of the previous section, where it was found that firms in these industries had 
shown a shakier performance, one of the reasons being the restraint imposed by the overvalued 
real. 
For telephone rates, the table shows that price effects started when the 
telecommunications industry was being prepared for privatization, as early as 1996.  In 
particular, the minimum monthly fee for access to a line received a sharp increase. This has 
been a source of gains to the telephone companies, but no one in Brazil would dispute that it 
was followed by a massive expansion of services to the point of destroying the market that 
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previously existed for trading telephone lines, at prices sometimes reaching two or three 
thousand dollars, or even more when the dollar was overvalued.  
In electricity, the rate restructuring began in 1995. Privatization itself started in 1997, 
and the concessionaries signed an incentive contract with a pass-through of non-controllable 
costs clause. Thus, with the devaluation in 1999, they where allowed to adjust prices for the 
dollar-denominated contracts they had, for instance, with suppliers from Paraguay. 
The conclusion with respect to prices is that they have been a source of gains to 
privatized firms in the telecommunications and electricity industries. Regulation cum 
privatization made prices follow contracts and other rules, thus reducing the scope for political 
manipulation that existed when the government played a larger entrepreneurial role in these 
industries. In the telecommunications industry this role practically ceased to exist, but it is still 
strong in electricity, particularly in power generation. 
 
 
Table 7. Evolution of Relative Prices* 
All Indexes Aligned to 100 on August 1994 
Year**   CPI-A 















1993 10.7  n.a.  n.a. 12.6 9.6 9.6 9.0 9.3 11.4 11.3
1994 108.9  100.0  88.6 99.7 99.8 100.7 108.8 101.4 100.4 102.8
1995 133.4  103.5 108.5 108.7 117.5 125.9 123.0 110.6 112.7 109.6
1996 146.1  130.5 199.2 125.5 122.2 138.3 122.4 117.5 123.9 113.4
1997 153.8  143.2 199.2 132.5 128.7 138.7 1290 127.3 129.9 119.2
1998 156.3  143.2 199.2 139.0 125.4 140.5 119.9 132.0 132.1 113.0
1999 170.3  173.2 199.2 226.6 160.1 189.0 166.5 155.4 200.7 170.3
2000 180.4  194.2 239.1 306.6 177.9 198.4 174.4 172.7 249.2 186.6
*The sectoral prices for electricity and telephone were obtained from the CPI calculated by FIPE in São 
Paulo. For the sectors, prices were obtained from the Wholesale Price Index calculated by the Getúlio 
Vargas Foundation. 
** Averages of the monthly indices.  
    
 
 
5.3. A Social Cost: No Democratization of Capital Ownership 
 
Macedo (2000) points out that some groups in Brazilian society were excluded from the 
privatization auctions and, therefore, from the opportunities to gain from them. As a rule, the 
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privatization program did not resort to public offers to any significant degree.  Moreover, 
some groups were not allowed to participate in the auctions, although they could have been 
given access.  Even without cash to pay, they hold public sector liabilities, which could have 
been exchanged for shares of the SOEs being privatized.  Among these liabilities, there are the 
unfunded ones of the present and future pensioners of the social security system, and the 
deposits that formal workers hold in their accounts of the Workers’ Tenure Guarantee Fund. 
This fund, known as FGTS (Fundo de Garantia de Tempo de Serviço), accumulates on a 
monthly basis a percentage of wages and salaries, to be used in case of termination or 
dismissal of the workers. Macedo’s conclusion was that because of this discrimination, the 
privatization process failed in one of its stated objectives: democratizing capital ownership in 
Brazil. Only recently were workers allowed to use their FGTS deposits in successful public 
offers of a block of Petrobrás shares and another block of remaining state-owned shares of the 
Vale do Rio Doce mining company.  
 
5.4.  Effects on the Development of Capital Markets  
 
A goal of the program was to maximize the revenue from sales. Many of the former SOEs 
were structured as public companies and, therefore, subject to laws governing the stock 
market. Before 1996, minority investors in Brazil were protected with features such as “tag 
along” (giving minority investors the right to sell their shares at the same price as the 
managing block in case of change in control), and oppressed minority rights (having their 
shares bought back at book value in cases of restructuring, such as mergers or divestitures). As 
some companies had to be restructured for privatization (for instance, Telebrás, the state 
holding company for telecommunications, was split in 12 different firms), there was the fear 
that lawsuits from minority shareholders could have hampered the privatization process and\or 
reduced the revenues from auctions. This led the government to reform the legislation. 
  The amendments to the corporate law revoked the tag along and the oppressed minority 
rights clauses. To mitigate the impact, the legislation entitled non-voting shares to an 
additional 10 percent in dividends over those paid to voting shares. In any case, as the post-
privatization experience has shown, without the protective clauses, minority shareholders have 
in several cases been victims of controlling groups’ opportunistic behavior.  
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At the end of the last decade, influential works such as those of Levine (1997), Levine 
and Zervos (1998), and La Porta et al. (1997) helped to confirm the view that the development 
of capital markets is important to promote economic growth, and that protecting minority 
investors’ rights is the best way to promote capital markets. In 2000 and 2001 the Brazilian 
Congress discussed a bill to increase minority shareholders’ rights. This bill would 
contemplate the return of tag along and oppressed minority rights. Unfortunately, the new law 
that emerged establishes tag along for only 80 percent of the minority shares and the new 
oppressed minority rights have been extensively criticized as inadequate. Thus, the adverse 
effect of privatization on stock markets is likely to last.  
 
5.5. A Macroeconomic Cost: No Effective Debt Reduction and a Delayed Devaluation 
 
Macedo (2000) also claims that privatization had a “macroeconomic cost” as the generated 
revenues—to the government budget, and to the external accounts through foreign direct 
investment—delayed a genuine fiscal adjustment and the necessary devaluation of the real.  It 
is important to understand the details of this argument because it warns of the risks of 
misusing privatization resources in conditions of fiscal and external imbalances and in the 
presence of soft budget constraints.    
Privatization was to help the fiscal crisis and the external imbalance, but this intended 
benefit was lost because in its first term (1995-1998), the Cardoso administration increased the 
fiscal deficit. Moreover, the new currency, the real, had clearly become overvalued 
immediately after its release in 1994. With its political capital linked to price stabilization, the 
government opted for defending the real, afraid of the impact of a devaluation on prices. Very 
high interest rates were the main policy instrument. These developments had the effect of 
seriously aggravating the budget deficit and debt, the payment of debt interest, and the 
external imbalance. Thus, public debt increased from 29.2% of GDP in 1994 to 52.5% in 
2001; debt interest grew from 5.8% of GDP in 1996 to 11.8% in 2001; and the current account 
deficit went from less than 0.5% of GDP in 1994 to around 4% in 1997 and has remained this 
high since then.
21  
Thus, the privatization program did not accomplish the objective of reducing public 
debt. On the contrary, public expenses increased, more than compensating for the inflow of 
 
21 Data from the Central Bank and the National Treasury. 
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resources from the privatization auctions.
22 Macedo also argues that privatization allowed the 
financing of higher current account deficits, particularly in 1997 and 1998 when the program 
peaked and attracted substantial foreign investment. Although this inflow is usually considered 
a positive consequence of the process, it also contributed the postponement of a badly needed 
devaluation of the Brazilian currency.
23  
 
5.6. Privatization as a Tool for Imposing Fiscal Discipline: The Case of the States 
 
The fiscal policies of Brazilian states also contributed to the ballooning fiscal deficits and debt 
from 1994 to 1997.  Tight public sector budgets as a whole came only after 1998, as the debt 
size started to cause discomfort in the financial markets, and the external imbalance continued 
to deteriorate. The federal government then started to generate huge primary surpluses and was 
also increasingly able to impose fiscal discipline on the states. Privatization of the states’ 
assets played an important role in this process. The states had their debt transferred to the 
federal government, to which they became indebted themselves, but at more favorable interest 
rates. In order to obtain this benefit, the states had to make commitments to restrain further 
indebtedness on their part and also to privatize. Thus, the federal government was able to 
impose a tight fiscal constraint on the states that it has not adopted itself. 
 
5.7. Hidden Costs Not Yet Accounted for 
 
The Brazilian government still owes a full accounting of the resources it has invested in the 
firms to be privatized in the process of their restructuring and preparation for privatization.  
The information provided by BNDES on behalf of the government emphasizes only the 
amounts collected from the auctions.    
 
22 Macedo compares the fiscal picture at that time to what Kornai (1979) calls a soft budget constraint, typical of 
centralized governments whose budgets are only vaguely monitored or controlled by Congress and society if at 
all.  Under such conditions, the only effective constraint emerges when markets react to the piling up of debt and 
the interest rate becomes a problem in itself. 
23 Interestingly enough, the devaluation in early 1999 came after the telecom privatization auction in 1998, in 
which the presence of foreign direct investment was stronger.  These investments were seen by the market as a 
sign that the government could hold on to the overvalued real.  As the program came to a halt, devaluation came 
sooner than expected. 
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6. Public Opinion and Perspectives  
 
6.1. Public Opinion 
 
Privatization has not been popular in Brazil. A 2001 Latinbarómetero public opinion survey 
conducted in 16 Latin American countries reported that 53% of the respondents in Brazil 
believed that privatization had not been beneficial to the country (Lora and Panizza, 2002). 
Nonetheless, Brazilian public opinion about privatization was found to be more favorable than 
that of its neighbors: on average 63% of the respondents in all the surveyed countries believed 
that privatization had not been beneficial to their nations. The countries in which the public 
appeared to be less discontented with privatization were Chile (47%) and Venezuela (46%). 
For all the other countries, approval ratings were lower than in Brazil.
24  
  Several factors contributed to the unpopularity. Looking at those that we consider to be 
the most important, we notice that in most cases the average citizen is not able to fully identify 
the benefits of privatization such as those analyzed in this paper.  The creation of non-banking 
SOEs in Brazil—such as steel and mining—followed the Second World War. Its main 
motivation was the belief that the state had to play a major role in “strategic” industries, the 
products of which tend to be remote from the pressing concerns of the population. Thus, one 
cannot expect the public to be concerned with the outcome of privatization in these industries, 
nor to be inclined to evaluate its technicalities. 
The total privatization of the telecommunications industry and the partial privatization 
of the electricity SOEs produced mixed outcomes for the consumer.  Both were followed by 
higher rates, which have blurred the favorable impact of a major expansion of 
telecommunications services.  In electricity, a further negative impact emerged in 2001 when 
the country had to face rationing due to the low levels of the reservoirs of the hydroelectric 
plants, which constitute the basis of power generation in the country. Opponents of the 
privatization were eager to blame it for the crisis. 
It is also important to highlight that privatization coincided with sluggish growth, 
particularly after the program peaked in 1997-1998.  Therefore, dissatisfaction with lower 
economic gains or even losses, such as those emerging from the higher rates of 
 
24 The other countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. 
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unemployment, are likely to have developed into criticisms of government policies in general 
and privatization in particular. 
  Moreover, as already pointed out, the government failed in its objective of using the 
program to democratize capital ownership. Only recently it resorted to successful public 
offerings in which workers were entitled to participate by using their FGTS deposits. Thus, as 
a rule the common citizen was left out of the process and its benefits in the form of rewards to 
the controllers and shareholders.  
Opposition to the program also resulted from its unfavorable treatment by the media: 
court battles to impede the auctions, attempts to disrupt the auctions themselves, sometimes 
followed by police intervention, and so forth. The news coverage of the privatization of the 
telecommunication industry was particularly negative as there were accusations that some 
government authorities had been involved in arm-twisting to attract and assemble groups to 
participate in the auctions.  Recorded tapes of conversations held by government authorities 
among themselves and with interested parties reached the press. Even though the legal battles 
were decided in favor of privatization, the uproar was serious enough to cause the Minister of 
Communications to resign in November of 1998. 
News of this sort has inevitably aroused suspicions that the process has been tainted by 
wrongdoings. The analysis of Lora and Panizza (2002) revealed that opposition to 
privatization, again measured by the percentage of those who do not consider it beneficial, was 
lower in Brazil than in its neighbors. Generally approval ratings are higher in those countries 
with extensive privatization and limited corruption. In this respect, Brazil ranks second only to 
Chile in an evaluation involving the above-mentioned group of 16 countries. In any case, 
although faring better in relative terms, it is clear that privatization is not popular in the 
country, a finding that is not surprising given the reasons pointed out above. 
Although the privatization program has not been popular in general, a different picture 
emerges from a study by Lamounier and De Souza (2002), which focused only on the opinion 
of a group called the “Brazilian elites,” composed of 500 businessmen (including leaders of 
associations of small and medium firms), union leaders, congressmen, high echelon members 
of the executive and judiciary branches of government, journalists, religious leaders, directors 
of NGOs and intellectuals.  On average, 62% responded that they approved or tended to 
approve of privatization. The rates ranged between 87% for members of the executive branch 
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of government to 13% for union leaders, whose rate was the only one below 45%.  Another 
question was directed at the performance of the companies after privatization. In this case, the 





The overall unpopularity and its causes were among the reasons for the privatization 
program’s having come to a virtual standstill since 1998.  According to BNDES, the proceeds 
from the auctions, including new concessions of public services, fell from US$26.3 billion in 
1997 and US$35.7 billion in 1998 to US$4.2 billion in 1999, US$10.2 billion in 2000 (this 
figure includes the privatization of a state bank, Banespa, which totaled US$3.6 billion and 
had been in the pipeline for a long time), US$2.8 billion in 2001, and US$2.2 billion in 2002.
26  
Other factors also explain the current status of the program.  First, moving ahead would 
have meant including those SOEs that have stronger political patronage than those privatized 
thus far. If one looks at the list of remaining SOEs presented in Table A.1.3 in Appendix 1, in 
the banking industry there is the almost two-century-old Banco do Brasil, a commercial bank 
of which the federal government is the controlling shareholder.  It holds the government’s 
accounts and is the key player in providing agricultural credit subsidized by the federal budget. 
In this fashion, it has built a major constituency as private banks have refrained from being 
more active in agricultural credit. Its staff, traditionally selected by public examinations, is a 
breeding ground for government officers. Some of them have reached the ministerial level or 
have become members of Congress and are very influential. Moreover, the bank is a not 
entirely an SOE, but has private shareholders who act as a group to maintain its present status.  
In the oil industry, there is the giant Petrobrás. The company was established in 1954, 
following a strong nationalist stance against foreign oil companies. Petrobrás proved effective 
in finding oil in Brazil. It moved into offshore drilling in the 1980s, and has set worldwide 
records in deep-water exploitation. Domestic production that currently accounts for 90% of the 
 
25 The highest rates were given to the aviation industry (80%), in which Embraer, the only former SOE, has been 
very successful, steel (65%) and telecommunications (58%). The lowest were received by railroads (9%), 
electricity (13%) and an airline (11%) (this was a case of one small company that belonged to the state of São 
Paulo, individually privatized in the mid-1980s).  
26 In 2000, for the first time since the program started, the federal government resorted to a public offer of 
minority shares in Petrobrás totaling US$4 billion, in which workers were also allowed to participate with their 
FGTS deposits. The operation was very successful, as was another public offer of a remaining state-owned block 
of minority shares of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, sold in 2002 for US$1.9 billion.  
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country’s needs is seen as a sign of success.  It had a monopoly in prospecting, production and 
importing in the upstream market until 1995. Since then, it continues to have a virtual 
monopoly in these activities, as well as in refining.  As oil is associated with national security 
issues, keeping Petrobrás under government control is seen as crucial by the military.   
Moreover, the company also has private shareholders who support its current and very 
profitable status.       
  In the electricity industry, the privatization process occurred mainly in the distribution 
sector. A few important companies in this sector were kept by state governments unwilling to 
move in the direction of privatization. With respect to the generation segment, the state of São 
Paulo privatized a large part of its assets. At the federal level, only one subsidiary of a federal 
holding company, Eletrobrás, was privatized. The three remaining subsidiaries control around 
60% of the country’s generation. After the 2001 drought, which led to a rationing, the process 
of sector restructuring stalled. The rationing stimulated industry and households to adopt 
energy-saving measures, and in the aftermath demand has not recovered its previous levels. 
Both rationing and demand reduction brought losses to the industry, exacerbating the dollar 
indebtedness of some privatized companies since 1999. With both distribution and generation 
companies currently suffering huge losses, the federal government, which regulates the entire 
industry, is preparing a new sector arrangement. At the same, BNDES has to find a way to 
manage huge debts on the verge of default. Thus, it is an industry in disarray, not attractive to 
private investors and in need of reorganization before any discussion of a new round of 
privatizations. 
  In spite of these shortcomings, there are no plans for privatization reversal in Brazil, 
either at the moment or in the foreseeable future. The new federal government, inaugurated in 
2003, is for the first time led by the Worker’s Party, which won the presidential election as an 
opposition party.  It fought privatization in Congress and in the courts in the 1990s, but since 
taking power it has adopted conservative fiscal and monetary policies and avoided 
condemning privatization. In this context, there is no room for privatization reversal, nor has 
the government even been suggesting it in discourse. Apparently, the government is likely to 
keep the program stalled—that is, no privatization reversal, but no further advances.  
  Even in light of these new political developments, the possibility of resuming the 
privatization effort should not be ignored: a serious fiscal problem remains in the form of large 
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and difficult-to-manage public deficits and debt. They have been kept under control at the cost 
of huge increases in the tax burden, which moved from 25.7% of GDP in 1993 to a record 
level of 35.9% in 2002, an exceptionally high rate for a developing country.
27  Under such 
conditions, a new start of the privatization program could help to alleviate the fiscal accounts. 
Moreover, as the new government has been willing to reconsider many of the cherished 
dogmas it subscribed to when in opposition, there is a chance that even its current stance 
against new privatization efforts might be reconsidered as well.  Thus, to give new life to 
privatization, it is important to continue the monitoring the process and publicizing of the 
results of the program and the inefficiencies of the remaining SOEs.  In addition, the objective 
of democratizing capital ownership by means of public offers should be brought to the front 
line, both for its own merits and to attract wider political support, in particular by making 
privatization more appealing to President Lula da Silva’s government.  
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This paper has focused mainly on the changes in the performance of companies that have been 
privatized in Brazil since 1991. It confirmed previous findings that the firms became more 
efficient after privatization. It has contributed to the literature, first by bringing to a wider 
audience studies available only in Brazil and in Portuguese.  It is also more updated than 
previous studies, since it covers data up until 2000. In terms of the companies covered, it is the 
most comprehensive thus far. In the sample, a selection bias was avoided by including both 
large and small firms, as well as those listed and unlisted on the stock exchange.  All 
companies for which information was available have been included in the analysis. In addition 
to tests of means and medians, the research also resorted to panel data analysis in an attempt to 
fully utilize the information provided by the data. Moreover, the analysis of performance 
before and after privatization was also made in comparison to the private sector, taken as a 
control group over time. Finally, this study was undertaken by an independent team while 
most of the previous ones were done by staff members of BNDES.  
In addition to the findings on improved efficiency, the paper has identified some 
sources of gains made by privatized firms in the form of a reduction in direct employment and 
 
27 The source of the tax burden data is the Secretary of Federal Revenue, Ministry of Finance, as published by 
Folha de São Paulo (May 10
th, 2003).  
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of increased prices. The paper has also shown other costs in the sense that the benefits of 
privatization could have been higher had the government not used the revenues to sustain its 
misguided policy of enlarging fiscal deficits and adopting high interest rates to defend the real. 
Moreover, foreign investment attracted by privatization and the high interest rates also 
contributed to the postponement of devaluation.  In any case, what is to blame are the fiscal, 
interest rate and exchange rate policies, not privatization itself.   
The benefits could also have been greater had the government not neglected the 
opportunity of privatization for democratizing capital ownership.  In the capital markets, 
privatization also brought costs in the form of reducing the rights of minority shareholders, 
therefore hampering the development of these markets.  
The study has also shown that although there is evidence that privatization is approved 
of by a majority of the Brazilian elite, it is not viewed as beneficial by the majority of the 
population, as revealed by public opinion surveys.  After pointing out some of the reasons 
behind this unpopularity and looking at the current status of the program, the paper concludes 
that the door to new privatization efforts remains open. One suggestion is to give the program 
popular appeal in the form of public offers in which workers would be entitled to participate 
with their own financial assets, including the deposits they hold in the FGTS.  
With respect to future research, it is particularly necessary to further clarify costs, to 
look at the impact of privatization at the industry level, and at the role of the regulatory 
agencies that have emerged in the wake of the state’s backing away from its role as an 
entrepreneur. 
To conclude we return to Megginson and Netter (2001), quoted at the start of this 
paper.  The Brazilian privatization program is indeed likely to remain influential because of its 
scale and the size of the country. Hopefully, it will continue to have an impact because of the 
successes and benefits of the program, not for the mistakes that have been made. 
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Table A.1.1. Federal State Enterprises Privatized between 1990 and 2000 
Date of 
Auction 
Auction Result     











CELMA  Cia. Eletromecânica  11/01/91  96    0 
MAFERSA  Mafersa S.A.  11/11/91  50    0 
  0 
Cosinor Distribuidora (Cosinor Dist.)* 
11/14/91 15    0 
SNBP  Serviço de Navegação da Bacia do Prata  1/14/92  12    0 
INDAG  Indag Fertilizantes  1/23/92  7   0 
2/14/92  109    1 
PETROFLEX  Petroflex Indústria e Comércio S.A.  4/10/92  255    1 
COPESUL  Cia. Petroquímica do Sul  5/15/92  871    1 
Cia. Nacional de Álcalis    0 
CAN  7/15/92 87    0 
CST  Cia. Siderúrgica de Tubarão  7/16/92 to 
7/23/92  837 1 
NITRIFLEX  Nitriflex  8/6/92  35   1 
FOSFÉRTIL  Fertilizantes Fosfatados S.A.  8/12/92  226    1 
9/11/92  188   0 
PPH  PPH  9/29/92  94   0 
GOIASFÉRTIL  Goiás Fertilizantes S.A.  10/8/92  22    0 
Cia. Aços Especiais Itabira    1 
  ACESITA  10/23/92 697 
Auction Company  Name 
Privatiz. 






















Acesita Energética (Energética)*  0 0 
Forjas Acesita (Fasa)*  0 0 
CBE  Cia Brasileira de Estireno  12/3/92  11   1 0 
   *Poliolefinas  3/19/93  87   0 0 
Cia. Siderúrgica Nacional    1 1  CSN 
  Fábrica de Estruturas Metálicas S.A.* 
2,028    0 0 
ULTRAFÉRTIL  Ultrafértil S.A. Indústria e Comércio de Fertilizantes  6/24/93  226    1 0 
COSIPA  Cia. Siderúrgica Paulista  8/20/93  1,470    1 1 
AÇOMINAS  Aço Minas Gerais S.A.  9/10/93  721    1 0 
OXITENO  Oxiteno  9/15/93  56   1 1 
PQU  Petroquímica União S.A.  1/25/94  328    1 1 
ARAFERTIL  Arafértil Fertilizantes – ARAFÉRTIL  4/15/94  13    0 0 
CARAÍBA  Mineração Caraíba LTDA.  7/28/94  6    1 0 
ACRINOR  Acrinor 8/12/94  13    0 0 
COPERBO  Coperbo  8/16/94  32   0 0 
CIQUINE  Ciquine  8/17/94  30   1 1 
POLIALDEN  Polialden  8/17/94  19   1 1 
POLITERO  Politeno  8/18/94  73   1 1 
Empresa Brasileira de Aeronáutica (Embraer)    1 1 
Embraer Aircraft Corporation (EAC)*    0 0 
Embraer Aviation International (EAI)*    0 0 
EMBRAER 
Indústria Aeronáutica Neiva (Neiva)* 
12/7/94 455 
  0 0 
 
4/2/93 






Auction Company  Name  Date of 
Auction 








ESCELSA  Espírito Santo Centrais Elétricas S.A.  7/11/95  522    1 1 
COPENE  Cia. Petroquímica do Nordeste  8/15/95  745   1 1 
CPC  CPC  9/29/95  161   0 0 
CQR  CQR  10/5/95  2   1 0 
SALGEMA  SALGEMA  10/5/95  183   0 0 
NITROCARBONO  Nitrocarbono  12/5/95  37   1 1 
PRONOR  Pronor  12/5/95  99   1 1 
POLIPROPILENO  Polipropileno  2/1/96  86   1 1 
KOPPOL  Koppol  2/1/96  70   0 0 
LIGHT  Light Serviços de Eletricidade S.A.  5/21/96  3,094    1 1 
DETEN  Deten  5/22/96  12   1 0 
POLIBRASIL  *Polibrasil  8/27/96  111   0 0 
EDN  Estireno do Nordeste- EDN  9/26/96  16   1 1 
CVRD  Cia. Vale do Rio Doce  5/6/97  6,858    1 1 
CODESP  Terminal de Contêiners Tecon 1 (Codesp)  9/17/97  251   0 0 
CDRJ  CDRJ - Porto de Angra do Reis  11/5/98  8   0 0 
CDRJ  CDRJ-Terminal de Conteineres 1 – Porto de Sepetiba 9/3/98  79   0 0 
CDRJ  CDRJ-Terminal Roll-on Roll-off do Porto do Rio  11/3/98  26   0 0 
CDES  Cia. Docas do Espírito Santo- Cais de Capuaba   5/6/98  26   0 0 
CDES  Cia. Docas do Espírito Santo -Cais de Paul   5/13/98  9   0 0 
CODEBA  Cia. Docas da Bahia  12/21/99  21   0 0 
RFF  Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. (Nordeste)  7/18/97  15   0 0 
RFF  Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. (Oeste)  3/5/96  63   0 0 
RFF  Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. (SP)  11/10/98  206   1 0 
RFF  Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. (Sudeste)   9/20/96  870   1 0 
RFF  Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. (Sul)  12/13/96  209   0 0 
RFF  Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. (Tereza Crisitina)  11/22/96  18   0 0 
RFF  Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A.(Centro-Leste)   6/14/96  316   0 0 
MERIDIONAL  Banco Meridional do Brasil S.A.  12/4/97  240    0 0 
EMBRATEL  Embratel 7/29/98  2,276    1  1 
TELESP  Telesp Operacional, Borda do Campo  7/29/98  4,967    2 1 
Telepar, Telebrasília, Telegoiás  and other  4 closed  CENTRO 




Telerj, Telebahia, Telemig, Telpe, Telma, Telest,   NORTE LESTE 




  Aggregate transferred debt of these companies    2,125       
  Telecom offers to employees    293       
TELESP CEL  Telesp Celular  7/29/98  3,082    1  0 
SUDESTE  CEL.   7/29/98  1,168    1 0 
TELEMIG CEL.    7/29/98 649    1 0 
CELULAR SUL    7/29/98 601    4 0 
NORDESTE  CEL.    7/29/98 567    7 0 
LESTE  CEL.    7/29/98 368    2 0 
CENT. OESTE CEL.  Telegoiás Celular and other 5 closed companies  7/29/98  378    3 1 
 






Auction Company  Name  Date of 
Auction 








TELE NORTE C    7/29/98 161    2 0 
GERASUL  Centrais Geradoras do Sul do Brasil S.A.  9/15/98 1,962    1 0 
GUARARAPES  GUARARAPES  12/7/98  0.1   1 1 
DATAMEC  Datamec S.A.  6/23/99 49    0 0 
BANESPA  Banco do Estado de São Paulo  11/20/00  3,604    0 0 
Petrobrás   Petrobrás** 8/9/00  4,032    1 1 
           
Total 56,841.20    75  38 
 
Source: BNDES 
1  Includes transferred debt. 
* Sold with mother company. 
** Minority shares privatization in remaining SOE. 




Table A.1.2. Companies Privatized by BNDES on Behalf of Brazilian States, Minority Shares 
Privatized by Federal Government, and São Paulo State Privatization Program 
Company Name  Date of 
Auction 








Banco Banerj S.A. –BANERJ  6/26/97  289   0 0 
Banco de Crédito de Minas Gerais S.A – Credireal  8/7/97  112   0 0 
Banco do Estado da Bahia –BANEB  7/22/99  147   0 0 
Banco do Estado de Minas Gerais – BEMGE  9/14/98  494   0 0 
Banco do Estado de Pernambuco S.A.   11/17/98  153   0 0 
Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina – BESC  9/30/97  28   0 0 
Centrais Elétricas Cachoeira Dourada  9/5/97  854   1 1 
Centrais Elétricas do Pará S.A. – CELPA  7/9/98  504   0 0 
CELPE  2000  1135   1 1 
Centrais Elétricas Matogrossenses S.A.-CEMAT   11/27/97  814   1 1 
CESP Paranapanema  7/28/99  1,164   1 1 
CESP TIETÊ  11/1/99  1,140   1 1 
Cia de Gás de São Paulo –COMGÁS  4/14/99  1,076   1 1 
Cia União de Seguros Gerais  11/20/97  45   0 0 
Cia. Centro Oeste de Dist. de Energia Elétrica- (AES-SUL)  10/21/97  1,436   1 1 
Cia. De Eletricidade de Minas Gerais-CEMIG *  5/28/97  1,053   1 1 
Cia. De Eletricidade do Estado da Bahia-COELBA  7/31/97  1,965   1 1 
Cia. De Eletricidade do Rio de Janeiro-CERJ  11/20/96  951   1 1 
Cia. De Navegação do Rio de Janeiro – CONERJ  2/5/98  29   0 0 
Cia. De Saneamento Básico de São Paulo-SABESP *  7/31/97  375   1 1 
Cia. De Saneamento Básico do Paraná-SANEPAR *  6/8/98  217   1 1 
Cia. Energética de Brasília- CEB *  4/30/97  74   1 1 
Cia. Energética do Ceará- COELCE  4/2/98  1,338   1 1 
Cia. Estadual de Gás do Rio de Janeiro-CEG  7/14/97  430   1 0 
Cia. Fluminense de Trens Urbanos  7/15/98  240   0 0 
Cia. Metropolitano do Rio de Janeiro *  12/19/97  262   0 0 
Cia. N. NE de Dist. de Energia Elétrica- CEEE – (RGE)  10/21/97  1,635   1 1 
Cia. Paranaense de Energia – COPEL *  9/20/96  413   1 1 
Cia. Paulista de Força e Luz- CPFL  11/5/97  2,833   1 1 
Cia. Riograndense de Telecomunicações-CRT  6/19/98  2,496   1 1 
COSERN  12/12/97  718   1 0 
 
 






Company Name  Date of 
Auction 








EBE –BANDEIRANTE DE ENERGIA  9/17/98  1,235   1 0 
Elektro Eletricidade e Serviços S.A.  –ELEKTRO  7/16/98  1917   1 0 
Eletricidade de São Paulo S.A. –Metropolitana  4/15/98  3,445   1 0 
Empresa Energética de Mato Grosso do Sul – ENERSUL  11/19/97  783.0   1 0 
Empresa Energética de Sergipe- ENERGIPE  12/3/97  560   0 0 
Estrada de Ferro Paraná Oeste S.A.-Ferroeste   12/10/96  25   0 0 
Riogás S.A.   7/14/97  146   0 0 
Terminal Garagem Menezes Côrtes  10/28/98  67   0 0 
Total   32,598    27  18 
Source: BNDES. 
1  Includes transferred debt. 
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Table A.1.3. Remaining State-Owned Enterprises  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. PRODUCTIVE SECTOR 
 
1.1 – ELETROBRÁS GROUP  (Electricity) 
•  Centrais Elétricas Brasileiras S.A. – ELETROBRÁS 
Boa Vista Energia S.A. - BOVESA 
Centrais Elétricas de Rondônia S.A. - CERON 
Centrais Elétricas do Norte do Brasil S.A. – ELETRONORTE 
Centro de Pesquisas de Energia Elétrica – CEPEL 
Companhia de Eletricidade do Acre - ELETROACRE    
Companhia de Geração Térmica de Energia Elétrica – CGTEE 
Companhia Energética de Alagoas – CEAL 
Companhia Energética do Amazonas - CEAM 
Companhia Energética do Piauí - CEPISA 
Companhia Hidro Elétrica do São Francisco - CHESF 
Eletrobrás Termonuclear S.A. - ELETRONUCLEAR 
Empresa Transmissora de Energia Elétrica do Sul do Brasil S.A. - ELETROSUL 
FURNAS Centrais Elétricas S.A. 
LIGHTPAR - Light Participações S.A.   
Manaus Energia S.A. - MANAUS ENERGIA 
 
1.2 – PETROBRÁS GROUP (Oil) 
•  Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. - PETROBRÁS 
Braspetro Oil Services Company - BRASOIL 
Petrobrás Distribuidora S.A. - BR 
Petrobrás Gás S.A. - GASPETRO 
Petrobrás Internacional S.A. – BRASPETRO 
Petrobras International Finance Company – PIFCO 
Petrobrás Química S.A. - PETROQUISA 
Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Bolívia-Brasil S.A. - TBG 
Indústria Carboquímica Catarinense S.A. - ICC (Em Liquidação) 
Petrobrás Transporte S.A. - TRANSPETRO 
Fronape International Company – FIC 
 
1.3 – OTHER 
Ports 
Companhia Docas do Ceará - CDC 
Companhia Docas do Espírito Santo - CODESA 
Companhia das Docas do Estado da Bahia - CODEBA 
Companhia Docas do Estado de São Paulo - CODESP 
Companhia Docas do Maranhão - CODOMAR 
Companhia Docas do Pará - CDP 
Companhia Docas do Rio de Janeiro - CDRJ 
Companhia Docas do Rio Grande do Norte - CODERN 
 Transportation 
Rede Ferroviária Federal S.A. – RFFSA (In process of liquidation) 
Rede Federal de Armazéns Gerais Ferroviários S.A. – AGEF (In process of liquidation)  
              Other 
BB-Administradora de Cartões de Crédito S.A. - BB-CAR 
BB-Corretora de Seguros e Administradora de Bens S.A. - BB-COR 
BB-TUR Viagens e Turismo Ltda. 
BEM Serviços Gerais Ltda. – BEM SG 
 




Table A.1.3.  
(continued) 
________________________________________________________________________________________ 
BEM Vigilância e Transporte de Valores S.A. – BEM VTV 
Casa da Moeda do Brasil – CMB 
Centrais de Abastecimento de Minas Gerais S.A. - CEASA/MG 
Companhia de Armazéns e Silos do Estado de Minas Gerais - CASEMG 
Companhia de Entrepostos e Armazéns Gerais de São Paulo – CEAGESP 
COBRA - Computadores e Sistemas Brasileiros S.A. 
Empresa Brasileira de Correios e Telégrafos – ECT 
Empresa Brasileira de Infra-Estrutura Aeroportuária – INFRAERO 
Empresa de Processamento de Dados da Prev. Social – DATAPREV 
Empresa Gerencial de Projetos Navais – EMGEPRON 
Hospital Cristo Redentor S.A. – REDENTOR 
Hospital Fêmina S.A. – FÊMINA 
Hospital Nossa Senhora da Conceição S.A. – CONCEIÇÃO 
Indústria de Material Bélico do Brasil – IMBEL 
Sistema de Processamento de Dados, Planej. e Adm. de Cartões de Crédito Ltda. – SISPLAN 
Telecomunicações Brasileiras S.A. – TELEBRÁS 
 
2. FINANCIAL SECTOR 
•  Banco do Brasil S.A. - BB 
BB-Banco de Investimento S.A. - BB-BI 
BB-Distribuidora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A. - BB-DTVM 
BB-Financeira S.A., Crédito, Financ. e Investimento - BB-FIN 
BB-Leasing Company Ltd. - BB-LEASING  
BB-Leasing S.A. Arrendamento Mercantil - BB-LAM 
Brasilian American Merchant Bank - BAMB 
•  Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social - BNDES 
Agência Especial de Financiamento Industrial - FINAME 
BNDES Participações S.A. - BNDESPAR 
•  Banco do Estado de Goiás S.A. – BEG 
BEG Distribuidora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A. – BEG DTVM 
•  Banco do Estado de Santa Catarina S.A. – BESC 
BESC Distribuidora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A. – BESCVAL 
BESC Financeira S.A. Crédito, Financiamento e Investimento – BESCREDI 
BESC S.A. Arrendamento Mercantil – BESC LEASING  
•  Banco do Estado do Ceará S.A. – BEC 
BEC Distribuidora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários S.A. – BEC DTVM      
•  Banco do Estado do Maranhão S.A. – BEM 
BEM Distribuidora de Títulos e Valores Mobiliários Ltda. – BEM DTVM 
Banco da Amazônia S.A. – BASA 
Banco do Estado do Amazonas S.A. – BEA 
Banco do Estado do Piauí S.A. – BEP 
Banco do Nordeste do Brasil S.A. - BNB 
Caixa Econômica Federal - CEF 
IRB-Brasil Resseguros S.A. - IRB-BRASIL RE 










Table A.1.3.  
(continued) 
___________________________________________________________________ 
3. ENTERPRISES INCLUDED IN THE FISCAL BUDGET 
 
Companhia Brasileira de Trens Urbanos - CBTU 
Companhia de Desenvolvimento de Barcarena - CODEBAR 
Companhia de Desenvolvimento dos Vales do São Francisco e do Parnaíba - CODEVASF 
Companhia de Navegação do São Francisco - FRANAVE 
Companhia de Pesquisa de Recursos Minerais - CPRM 
Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento - CONAB 
Empresa Brasileira de Comunicação S.A. - RADIOBRÁS 
Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - EMBRAPA 
Empresa Brasileira de Planejamento de Transportes - GEIPOT 
Empresa de Trens Urbanos de Porto Alegre S.A. - TRENSURB 
Hospital de Clínicas de Porto Alegre - HCPA 
Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil S.A. - INB 
Nuclebrás Equipamentos Pesados S.A. – NUCLEP 
Serviço Federal de Processamento de Dados – SERPRO 
VALEC - Engenharia, Construções e Ferrovias S.A. 
 
4. OTHER 
Centrais de Abastecimento do Amazonas S.A. – CEASA/AM 
Petrobrás America Inc. – AMERICA 
Petrobrás U.K. Limited – BUK 
___________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Budget and Administration - Department of Coordination and Control of State 
Enterprises – Executive Secretary.  
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Appendix 2. Mean and Median Tests 
 
Method I (Two Years before versus Two Years after Privatization) 
 
As individual privatizations were undertaken over several years, this method compares the 
mean of the two years immediately before privatization with the mean of the two years 
immediately after it.  
Let   be the year of privatization for each former SOE i in our sample. Let  be 
the indicator value calculated for the j years before the privatization of each company i. Also 
let  be the indicator value calculated for the j years after the privatization of each 
company i. Finally, let M  and   be the mean values of the indicators for the before and 
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where  and  . The general mean/median value for financial 
indicators before and after privatization are given respectively by   and  (the 
























In this method, a particular indicator for a particular firm is included in the test only if 
there is data available for the four years as described. 
 
 
Method II (All Years before versus All Years after Privatization) 
 
Using the same terminology above, it is possible to re-write the array of variables in the 
following way.  
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The number of years included in the   and   is given by the availability of data in 
the data set. Once more, the general mean/median value for financial indicators before and 
after privatization are given respectively by   and  (the mean/median values of M  and 
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For this method, a particular indicator for a particular firm is included in the test if 
there are data available for at least one year before and one year after privatization. 
 
Adjustment for Comparisons with the Private Sector 
 
In order to filter macroeconomic fluctuations, we used a procedure similar to the one adopted 
in La Porta and López-de-Silanes (1999). We started by calculating the same indicators Xi
t as 
described above. Then, we calculated the same indicators for each company in our control 
group. Next we calculated the average across firms in the control group for every year,  , 
where j is the year. The control group includes only public companies controled by the private 
sector for which data were available over the whole period. Then, we took the differences 
between the privatized enterprises’ indicators and the indicators obtained from the private 
firms. Thus, for Method 1 the array of variables becomes 
j MEP
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while for Method II the array is given by 
) ( , ) ( ,
) ( , ) ( , , , , ) ( , ) ( , ) (
...... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... ..........
) ( , ) ( , ) ( , , , , ) (
) ( , ) ( , , , , ) ( , ) (
4 4 3 3
2 2 1 1
23

























+ + + +
+ + + + − − − − − −
+ + + + + + − −
+ + + + − − − −
− −
− − − − −
− − − −

















t t t t t t A B t t
t t t t A B t t t t
MEP X MEP X
MEP X MEP X M P M MEP X MEP X MEP X
MEP X MEP X MEP X M P M MEP X




  52 
 
 
Table A.2.1. Change in Performance: Tests of Means and Medians, Method I.a 
Two Years before Privatization versus Two Years after, without Adjustment 
 











0.037 0.042  0.536  Operating Income/Sales  66 
0.072 0.108  0.523 
0.092 0.141  3.556*  Operating Income/PPE  67 
0.035 0.107  3.566* 
0.000 -0.008  -0.595  Net Income/Sales  65 
0.034 0.039  0.677 
-0.860 0.008  0.291  ROA  70 
0.014 0.011  -1.287 
-1.152 0.046  0.662 
PROFITABILITY 
ROE  70 
0.019 0.039  0.862 
-0.273 -0.006  5.520*  Log (Sales/PPE)  63 
-0.201 0.009  5.492* 
0.375 0.251  -2.631* 
OPERATING 
EFFICIENCY 
Operating Costs/Sales  58 
0.200 0.196  -2.917* 
6.001 5.946  -1.981***  Log (PPE)  67 
5.891 5.813  -1.983*** 
0.295 -0.032  -2.550**  Investment/Sales  54 
0.158 0.093  -2.476** 
0.115 0.094  -1.202 
ASSETS 
Investment/PPE  57 
0.101 0.104  0.202 
5.644 5.876  4.335**  OUTPUT  Log (Sales)  63 
5.403 5.643  4.301** 
71.40 55.99  -0.089  SHAREHOLDERS  Payout Ratio  45 
30.78 48.66  0.166 
0.847 1.009  2.755*  Current  70 
0.745 0.866  3.089* 
0.636 0.701  2.506** 
FINANCE 
LTD/Equity  63 
0.181 0.269  2.506** 
0.024 -0.010  -3.834*  NET TAXES  Net Taxes/Sales  65 
0.017 0.007  -3.343* 
(1) We report Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the mean and the Rank Sum Test for the median. 
*** Significant at 1 percent;  ** Significant at 5 percent; * Significant at 10 percent. 
 




Table A.2.2. Change in Performance: Tests of Means and Medians, Method I.b 
Two Years before Privatization versus Two Years after, with Adjustment 











0.097 -0.430  -2.944*  Operating Income/Sales  66 
0.084 0.019  -2.944* 
-0.092 0.141  3.556*  Operating Income/PPE  67 
0.005 0.222  5.713* 
-0.004 -0.105  -1.476  Net Income/Sales  65 
0.020 0.012  -1.534 
-0.870 -0.014  0.824 ROA  70 
0.003 -0.012  -1.369
-1.194 0.025  1.768 ***
PROFITABILITY 
ROE  70 
-0.030 0.021  1.698 ***
-0.548 -0.298  3.980 ** Log (Sales/PPE)  63 
-0.522 -0.218  3.876 **
0.174 0.065  -1.837
OPERATING 
EFFICIENCY 
Operating Costs/Sales  58 
0.014 0.021  -0.809
1.445 1.002  -1.286 Log (PPE)  67 
0.955 0.871  -1.370
0.223 -0.058  -1.887 ** Investment/Sales  54 
0.117 0.066  -1.795 ***
0.038 0.024  -0.774
ASSETS 
Investment/PPE  57 
0.026 0.039  0.264 
0.774 0.901  3.306***  OUTPUT  Log (Sales)  63 
0.274 0.457  3.598*** 
0.309 -0.263  -0.229  SHAREHOLDERS  Payout Ratio  45 
-28.62 -5.805  0.299 
-0.510 -0.250  3.238*  Current  70 
-0.605 -0.250  3.768* 
0.254 0.108  -0.210 
FINANCE 
LTD/Equity  63 
-0.142 -0.325  -0.021 
0.018 -0.014  -3.578*  NET TAXES  Net Taxes/Sales  65 
0.005 0.003  -3.575* 
(1) We report Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the mean and the Rank Sum Test for the median. 
*** Significant at 1 percent;  ** Significant at 5 percent; * Significant at 10 percent. 
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Table A.2.3. Change in Performance: Tests of Means and Medians, Method II.a 
All Years before and after Privatization, without Adjustment 
 











-0.052 0.050  1.511  Operating Income/Sales  71 
0.080 0.096  1.037 
0.057 0.291  3.042*  Operating Income/PPE  70 
0.045 0.097  3.408* 
-0.067 -0.042  0.815  Net Income/Sales  68 
0.010 0.039  0.889 
-0.812 0.017  2.967*  ROA  73 
0.003 0.026  2.311** 
-1.109 0.021  2.258** 
PROFITABILITY 
ROE  73 
0.008 0.038  2.150** 
-0.247 -0.076  5.600*  Log (Sales/PPE)  64 
-0.285 0.012  5.244* 
0.428 0.245  -3.138* 
OPERATING 
EFFICIENCY 
Operating Costs/Sales  64 
0.255 0.207  -2.756* 
6.889 5.994  -1.141  Log (PPE)  70 
5.911 5.809  -0.952 
0.191 0.038  -1.406  Investment/Sales  61 
0.202 0.1131  -1.157 
-1.735 0.1181  0.288 
ASSETS 
Investment/PPE  62 
0.085 0.098  0.168 
5.823  6.004 2.032***  OUTPUT  Log (Sales)  64 
5.800 5.974  1.956*** 
34.406 30.860  -0.138  SHAREHOLDERS  Payout Ratio  59 
38.848 42.268  1.232 
0.849 1.106  2.662*  Current  73 
0.843  2.642* 
0.529 0.576  3.192* 
FINANCE 
LTD/Equity  66 
0.167 0.298  3.302* 
0.015 0.009  -3.821*  NET TAXES  Net Taxes/Sales  68 
0.018 0.006  -4.296* 
(1) We report Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the mean and the Rank Sum Test for the median. 
*** Significant at 1 percent;  ** Significant at 5 percent; * Significant at 10 percent. 
0.905 
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 Table A.2.4. Change in Performance: Tests of Means and Medians, Method II.b 
All Years before and after Privatization, with Adjustment 
 











-0.050  -0.005 0.107  Operating Income/Sales  71 
0.072 0.036  -0.241 
-0.003 0.385  6.112*  Operating Income/PPE  70 
-0.010 0.207  6.387* 
-0.084 -0.064  0.693  Net Income/Sales  68 
0.005 0.014  0.262 
-0.831 -0.003  3.130*  ROA  73 
-0.017 0.003  2.736* 
-1.159 -0.012  3.236* 
PROFITABILITY 
ROE  73 
-0.44 0.014  3.223* 
-0.677 -0.255  5.226**  Log (Sales/PPE)  63 
-0.600 -0.264  4.914** 
0.236 0.066  -3.199* 
OPERATING 
EFFICIENCY 
Operating Costs/Sales  64 
0.090 0.025  -2.819* 
1.380 1.017  -2.001*  Log (PPE)  69 
1.111 0.993  -1.885* 
0.098 0.011  -0.394  Investment/Sales  61 
0.123 0.086  -0.730 
-1.840 0.055  1.385 
ASSETS 
Investment/PPE  62 
0.022 0.029  1.072 
0.906 1.178  2.333***  OUTPUT  Log (Sales)  63 
0.855 1.029  2.599*** 
0.082 -5.963  -0.731  SHAREHOLDERS  Payout Ratio  59 
-29.35 -9.292  1.169 
-0.526 -0.232  3.653*  Current  73 
-0.503 -0.313  3.937* 
0.233 -0.002  -2.086** 
FINANCE 
LTD/Equity  66 
-0.107 -0.238  -2.286** 
0.007 0.005  -3.173*  NET TAXES  Net Taxes/Sales  68 
0.007 0.002  -3.534* 
(1) We report Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test for the mean and the Rank Sum Test for the median. 
*** Significant at 1 percent;  ** Significant at 5 percent; * Significant at 10 percent. 
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